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THE UNITED STATES ARMY AS A 
CONSTABULARY ON THE NORTHERN PLAINS 
LARRY D. BALL 
With the formation of the United States mili-
tary establishment in the late eighteenth cen-
tury, the new army undertook many services in 
the developing republic, including several asso-
ciated with the frontier movement. While the 
army considered the suppression of hostile Indi-
ans its primary mission in the West, its soldiers 
routinely supported civilian law enforcement 
authorities. After the Civil War, white crimi-
nals accompanied other American frontiers-
men onto the northern Plains, where white 
desperadoes soon posed a serious problem. In 
the late 1870s they descended upon the Black 
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Hills mining camps and looted stagecoaches in 
alarming numbers; brazenly robbed Union Pa-
cific trains and threatened to disrupt their sched-
ules; plundered Sioux, Arapahoe, and other 
Indian horse herds as well as those of white 
settlers; and even preyed upon military prop-
erty. This lawless onslaught threatened to 
overwhelm the nascent law enforcement agen-
cies of Wyoming, Dakota, and neighboring 
districts. Had the United States Army not 
reinforced the county sheriffs and United States 
marshals, this frontier crime wave of the 1870s 
might have been worse. 
United States forces began to participate in 
civilian law enforcement with the formation of 
the Union. While the Founding Fathers be-
lieved that the army's primary task was the 
defense of the nation again external enemies, 
the Constitution also called on the federal 
government to "insure domestic tranquility." 
At the same time the Federalist and Jeffersonian 
Republican parties, which played the primary 
role in formulating this peace-keeping doctrine, 
rightly feared excessive military intrusion into 
civilian law enforcement. The 1792 Congress 
prescribed circumstances for the president to 
call state militias into federal service and dis-
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patch them to the assistance of civilian lawmen, 
and the 1807 Congress extended this obligation 
to the regular army. The military could assume 
law enforcement powers only when a federal 
judge, state governor, or state legislature in-
formed the president of the United States that 
lawless elements had overwhelmed civil au-
thority and resisted all legal means to suppress 
them. Congress also legislated specific peace-
keeping assignments to the army, such as the 
expulsion of white intruders from public lands 
and the prevention of violations of the nation's 
borders.! 
The frontier army carried out a sizeable range 
of law enforcement duties since territorial gov-
ernments lacked the population necessary to 
support strong peace-keeping machinery. The 
bluecoats devoted much of their time to the less 
than satisfying duty of serving in the posses of 
frontier sheriffs and United States marshals. 
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, regu-
lating relations between the two races in the 
West, mandated such constabulary activities. 
The Intercourse Act of 1834, which codified 
the preceding fifty years of miliary experience 
on the frontier, authorized the army to police 
that region designated as Indian Country against 
illicit whiskey traders and other white law-
breakers. If United States marshals-the execu-
tive officers of the federal court system-were 
present, the regulars assisted them to make 
arrests. In the absence of marshals the soldiers 
made their own arrests and turned their prison-
ers over to the nearest civil magistrate.2 
The deepening slavery crisis in the mid-
nineteenth century expanded the civil employ-
ment of United States soldiers. Abolitionist 
mobs often overpowered United States mar-
shals as the latter attempted to arrest and trans-
port runaway slaves to their southern owners. In 
order to provide the federal lawmen with imme-
diate and dependable support, the federal gov-
ernment sought to shortcut the time-consum-
ing process established by Congress. In 1854 
United States Attorney General Caleb Cushing 
liberalized the definition of the posse comitatus. 
In the Anglo-American law enforcement tradi-
tion, peace officers possessed the authority to 
summon able-bodied male citizens as possemen. 
Cushing broadened the meaning of the 
"possemen" to include any federal military forces 
stationed within the lawman's jurisdiction. The 
United States forces-either army or navy-were 
part of, not separate from, the posse comitatus, 
declared the ingenious attorney general. While 
Cushing rendered this opinion for the benefit of 
federal lawmen in the East, his decision indi-
rectly came to the aid of frontier peacekeepers 
by providing them with immediate access to 
military garrisons. In the remote frontier re-
gions civilian officers could proceed to the 
nearest fort and obtain blue coated possemen 
without delay.3 
Soldiers serving as constabulary on the north-
ern Plains put in an appearance shortly after 
frontiersmen began the trek to Oregon and 
California in the 1840s. For more than a quarter 
of a century, the army provided the westward-
moving pioneers with many services, including 
protection not only from hostile Indians but 
also from lawless whites who preyed upon the 
wagon trains. When Union forces imposed 
martial law upon the overland trail during the 
Civil War, army officers also provided a justice 
system for travelers. And when the Union 
Pacific Railroad began to lay track across the 
Plains, the bluecoats temporarily policed the 
new rail communities, such as Cheyenne, Wyo-
ming. Since the white population of Wyoming 
and neighboring regions grew very slowly and 
both county and federal law enforcement re-
mained rudimentary in the 1870s, the military, 
according to historian Raymond Welty, "repre-
sented the [only] power of established order" on 
the northern Plains.4 
BANDITS IN THE BLACK HILLS 
The discovery of gold in the Black Hills in 
1874 and the subsequent rush to exploit this ore-
bearing region of western Dakota and eastern 
Wyoming increased the necessity for a military 
constabulary. The soldiers were called upon to 
perform contradictory assignments. First, they 
were ordered to prevent gold seekers from in-
truding upon the Black Hills, Indian treaty 
lands. Failing to stem the flow of prospectors, in 
1875 the bluecoats shifted their emphasis to 
protecting the interlopers. Soon the entire 
region surrounding the Hills bustled with thou-
sands of people searching for fortunes. Natu-
rally the lawless flotsam and jetsam of the 
frontier soon began to prey upon the miners in 
Deadwood and other camps. 
Cheyenne, the Wyoming capital, was the 
most important entrepot for the new economic 
paradise. The village lay on the Union Pacific 
Railroad some three hundred miles south of 
Deadwood, which became the most important 
Black Hills <;amp. Highway robbers became an 
especial problem on the Cheyenne-Deadwood 
highway and other roads leading into the re-
gion. The more reckless bandits began to 
threaten Union Pacific trains. Other despera-
does lowered their sights and supplied the hun-
gry mining camps with stolen livestock, par-
ticularly horses from the large Indian herds on 
reservations convenient to the Hills camps. 
Raiders also targeted army livestock and payroll 
wagons.5 
The size and composition of both robber 
bands and pursuing military units varied consid-
erably. Outlaw groups were, at best, temporary 
alliances of convenience. Duncan Blackburn's 
aggregation consisted of five men, while Big 
Nose George Parrott led six freebooters and Joel 
Collins and Sam Bass together the same num-
ber. Even Jesse and Frank James reportedly put 
in an appearance in the Black Hills. After 
capturing five outlaws in 1877, the army found 
the written "constitution" of a large horsethief 
operation in the camp. Each member had been 
assigned a number in place of his name. The 
existence of several small bands of robbers in the 
region at the same time aggravated the prob-
lems of capture. After a robbery, the highway-
men often separated into smaller units to thwart 
their pursuers. The pursuing military detach-
ments also varied in size-from two-man escorts 
for stagecoaches to ten- and twenty-man units 
on the chase. Although they were hunting for 
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outlaws, these larger patrols were necessary in 
the event of a chance encounter with hostile 
Indians.6 
REGULARS TO THE RESCUE 
In the absence of established civilian com-
munities, the military installations in and around 
the Black Hills proved invaluable substitutes in 
the search for order. With Fort Laramie, Wyo-
ming, as a hub, these posts often dispatched 
units of infantry or cavalry in a timely fashion 
against lawless whites and provided many ser-
vices to sheriffs and United States marshals. In 
addition to gathering intelligence about the 
movements of American desperadoes, the forts 
provided lawmen with food, sleeping quarters, 
guns and ammunition, hospital care, and even 
horses. Army guardhouses substituted for county 
jails, which were often insecure or nonexistent. 
While pursuing outlaws in July 1877, Deputy 
Sheriff Thomas F. Talbott of Cheyenne en-
joyed a generous reception at Fort Sanders, near 
Laramie, Wyoming. Post Commander A. G. 
Brackett "furnished fresh horses, rations, and 
everything needed for a hard, long ride," re-
called the grateful lawman, "and [Brackett] was 
sorry he could not do more." In tum, sheriffs and 
marshals often deputized civilian employees on 
the strategically placed military posts.7 
The pursuit of American livestock thieves 
became a common, if frustrating, duty of the 
regulars. In their efforts to satisfy the market for 
horses and cattle in new gold camps, the Ameri-
can rustlers pillaged the herds of the Indians, 
army, and even newly arrived settlers. Some 
white inhabitants who did not inquire as to the 
source of the animals shielded these pilferers 
from the authorities. In December 1878 Gen-
eral George Crook said that rustlers from west-
ern Nebraska had stolen the surprising number 
of two thousand ponies from the Red Cloud and 
Spotted Tail reservations in the previous two 
years. In March 1877 Major C. H. Carlton, 
Commandant of Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, 
reported the presence of several camps of des-
peradoes between the Laramie Mountains and 
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the Platte River. Carlton confessed, however, 
that his attempts to surprise the camps "have so 
far been unsuccessful," since local ranchers 
abetted the evildoers. In neighboring Dakota 
Territory Third Cavalry personnel pursued a 
band of Americans who had stolen Indian live-
stock. While the soldiers recovered fifty head of 
livestock in the village of Spearfish, the towns-
people protected the thieves.8 
The soldiers both won and lost in their on-
going efforts to suppress the raiders. After the 
theft of ponies from the Red Cloud Agency in 
Dakota Territory, in February 1877, cavalry-
men from Fort Laramie overtook the rustlers 
and captured two of them as they drove the 
stolen animals toward Nebraska. The Fort's 
post returns reported almost monthly sorties 
against white rustlers through the spring and 
summer of 1877. In March of that year, troops 
from Camp Robinson, Nebraska, ran down two 
rustlers and stopped over at Fort Fetterman, 
Wyoming, where, according to the post returns, 
"Nearly, if not all of the [stolen] ponies were 
recovered." The pursuit of desperadoes was 
dangerous. In March of 1876, Arapahoe Chief 
Black Cole appealed for military assistance 
against the raids of a notorious horse thief, 
William F. Chambers, alias Persimmon Bill. 
When Sergeant Patrick Sullivan and a detach-
ment of the Fort Fetterman garrison caught up 
with the outlaw leader, Bill treacherously shot 
and killed Sullivan.9 
The Army was also sometimes the victim of 
the outlaws. Army payrolls constituted one of 
the largest concentrations of hard currency in 
the wilderness and tempted white highwaymen. 
In August 1877 the Cheyenne Daily Leader re-
ported that soldiers had arrested a notorious 
thief at Camp Stambaugh after he had boasted 
about his plans to rob the army paymaster. A 
saloon keeper near Fort Laramie overheard crimi-
nals planning another such raid and informed 
local lawmen. In February 1879 Big Nose 
George Parrott and his gang stopped the army 
paymaster's escort near Terry, Montana. By a 
stroke of good fortune, the paymaster had al-
ready disposed of his funds, but the bandits took 
$3200 from a civilian merchant in the party.lO 
ORDER IN THE MINING CAMPS 
The bluecoats also provided assistance to 
lawmen in the Black Hills mining camps. Be-
cause Dakota Territory had failed to provide a 
legal county government for the Hills until 
1877, the miners were constrained to employ 
extra-legal forms of government. The residents 
of Deadwood selected Seth Bullock, a veteran of 
the Montana mining boom, as "de facto sheriff," 
but the energetic Bullock could not enforce the 
laws alone. In November 1877 workers occu-
pied the Keets Mine and refused to vacate until 
back wages were paid. Seth Bullock, by now a 
legal sheriff, called upon Acting Governor 
George H. Hand, who in turn requested the 
assistance of General Phil Sheridan, in Omaha, 
Nebraska. On 12 November 1877, Hand tele-
graphed the sheriff, "Have requested President 
to have soldiers cooperate with you." When the 
bluecoats arrived, the sheriff's posse and soldiers 
blockaded the mine shaft and smoked out the 
angry laborers with sulfur fumes. Upon receiv-
ing news of this surrender, Governor Hand 
expressed his appreciation to Sheriff Bullock for 
"the energy, faithfulness and discretion you 
have shown in this matter." Whether or not the 
workers received their wages is not shown in the 
accounts of this episode. ll 
PROTECTING THE STAGE ROUTE 
While the local authorities were usually able 
to maintain some order within the mining camps, 
the hinterlands were much less secure. Prospec-
tors, businessmen, freighters, and the ruffian 
element that always descended upon mining 
camps soon jammed the Cheyenne-Deadwood 
highway. The Cheyenne and Black Hills Stage 
Company, which began operations in 1876, 
made the most persistent demands for army 
protection. While military personnel occasion-
ally patrolled this and other highways against 
Indians, in April 1877 the Cheyenne Daily Leader 
reported that General Crook planned to assign 
more companies to protect the Black Hills 
highway. Crook, who was touring the region at 
this time, told the Daily Leader that his soldiers 
would be able to provide "perfect security" for 
the areaY 
Defeating the unpredictable and elusive high-
waymen proved more difficult than the general 
had envisioned. The army established three 
encampments along the Black Hills road and 
posted mounted escorts where robbers or Indi-
ans were suspected of lying in wait, but the 
bandits quickly spied out the routine of the 
cavalrymen and moved to other, unprotected 
sections of the road. In a letter to a superior, 
Major A. W. Evans of Fort Laramie observed 
that placing his men "at any point on the road 
would not prevent the coach [from] being 
stopped ten or twenty miles on either side" of 
his patrol areas. 13 
As the number of stagecoach robberies in-
creased to at least twenty-two in 1877-78, the 
Cheyenne and Black Hills Stage Company de-
manded additional protection, but the army 
found this firm as unpredictable as the outlaws 
and very difficult to satisfy. When bandits 
robbed three coaches in June 1877, Luke 
Voorhees, the company superintendent, in-
formed federal officials in Washington that he 
could no longer guarantee the security of the 
mail on his coaches unless the army established 
more encampments on the Black Hills road. 
When General Crook issued the necessary or-
ders, the company replied by requesting yet 
another increase of military forces. On 20 June 
1877 Superintendent Voorhees telegraphed 
Major Evans and asked for two soldiers to ride in 
each coach, presumably in addition to the horse 
guards. Again, General Crook complied with 
the company's wishes and instructed Major 
Evans to "Furnish an infantry guard to go with 
each stage on such parts of the mail route from 
your post to Deadwood as the proprietors of the 
mail line may wish."14 
In spite of the military's efforts to meet the 
express company's demands, the company curi-
ously failed to cooperate with the soldiers. Since 
each military guard inside a coach displaced a 
paying traveler, the stage line reserved the right 
to refuse seats to the troopers. Again, General 
Crook's office took this unusual and self-defeat-
ing act into consideration. The general's orders 
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to Captain A. W. Moore, on 20 July 1877, to 
place "two dismounted men ... on [each] coach 
going up" the Black Hills road, included the 
qualification "if there be room" on the coach. 
When bandits robbed a coach three days later, 
Lieutenant Campbell, a supervisor of the guards, 
reported "Soldiers not on coach, last night." 
There was "no room for them," he added.l5 
PROTECTING THE RAILROAD 
The army extended escort services to the 
Union Pacific Railroad in 1878, as highwaymen 
began to threaten the critical rail link with the 
Pacific Coast. The editor of the Daily Leader 
reacted indignantly to threats against the rail-
road, "the great national highway." As early as 
1876, bandits stopped an express train at Percy 
Station in western Wyoming, and two years 
later the ever-active Big Nose George Parrott 
planned a robbery near this same place. Al-
though the authorities thwarted him, the out-
laws murdered two deputy sheriffs who had 
inadvertently stumbled upon their camp.16 
On 13 September 1878, First Lieutenant 
Theodore C. True, Adjutant at Fort Sanders, 
Wyoming, issued the necessary orders "to pro-
tect the U. S. mails and passenger trains en route 
over the U. P. R. R. from Rock Springs to Carter 
Station." While intelligence sources reported 
at least two separate bands of train robbers 
lurking in the vicinity of Rock Springs, the 
presence of the military evidently discouraged 
them. As a general rule, frontier outlaws were 
discreet enough to avoid heavily guarded rail 
cars and stagecoaches and were content with 
the more modest spoils from lightly defended 
vehicles. Like the Cheyenne and Black Hills 
Company officials, Union Pacific executives 
soon began to make additional demands. Al-
though the official purpose of the military guard 
was to protect the mail cars, Superintendent 
Snow of the Laramie Division became con-
cerned about the vulnerability of trains stopped 
for meals at remote stations in western Wyo-
ming, so military authorities directed the troops 
to protect train and passengers at lonely sta-
tions. 17 
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SOLDIERS' OBJECTIONS, SUCCESSES, AND 
FAILURES 
The professional soldiers often objected to 
these constabulary assignments. Not only did 
they dislike serving under civilian lawmen, but 
they feared malicious law suits from the local 
population and anticipated opposition in Con-
gress. If they were ordered to perform such 
unwelcome duties, the soldiers preferred active 
pursuit of desperadoes in the field to passive 
guard and escort tasks. In the field they could at 
least put some training into effect and some-
times score a victory against the outlaws. In 
June 1877 Major A. W. Evans of Fort Laramie 
voiced objections to guard duty on the Black 
Hills stage coaches and complained that "the 
cure"--pursuit and capture of outlaws--was far 
superior to mere "prevention". In the previous 
month, one of Major Evans's units had captured 
four members of a large robber band. Later in 
the year Lieutenant George F. Chase and a 
Third Cavalry detachment captured two ban-
dits, who had unwisely robbed a coach only 
three miles from Fort Laramie. After an eighty-
five mile ride, Chase "gave the order for the 
charge" and opened fire within twenty yards of 
the fugitives. The two outlaws, John F. Babcock 
and Fonce Ryan, quickly surrendered. The 
Cheyenne Daily Leader observed the lieutenant 
and his men riding into the territorial capital on 
"weary and mud-bespattered horses" with their 
prisoners in tow. As Chase turned over his 
captives to the sheriff, this newspaperman con-
cluded that these blue coated manhunters de-
served "Great credit" for their efforts. 18 
The frontier army made a more significant 
contribution in the pursuit of highwaymen who 
robbed a Union Pacific train at Big Springs, 
Nebraska, in September 1877. Texas cowboys 
Joel Collins and Sam Bass and their gang were 
fresh from an unsuccessful series of holdups and 
at least one murder in the Black Hills when they 
robbed the train of $60,000 in gold coin and set 
off a massive manhunt. On 25 September, 
General George Crook ordered his troops to 
enter the fray and, since the desperadoes had 
fled southward toward their home state, alerted 
General John Pope, Commander of the Depart-
ment of the Missouri, in Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas. Pope threw out a cordon of forces along 
the Kansas Pacific Railroad to intercept the 
robbers. On 26 September a detachment of the 
16th Infantry shot and killed two suspects who 
resisted arrest at Buffalo Station, a small water 
stop in Ellis County, Kansas. The dead men 
proved to be gang leader Joel Collins and Bill 
Hefferidge. The infantrymen recovered eighty 
pounds of gold worth an estimated $22,000. 19 
Such successes did not reconcile the bluecoats 
to constabulary chores. They received no addi-
tional pay for chasing dangerous outlaws whose 
vicious threats against the soldiers may have 
tended to unnerve the young, inexperienced 
recruits. During a difficult winter chase through 
the mountains of Wyoming in November 1877, 
a unit of cavalrymen gave up the hunt for what 
some observers believed insufficient reasons. 
The horsemen claimed that their mounts were 
exhausted, but Scott Davis, the experienced 
express company detective leading the posse, 
continued on alone through a severe blizzard. 
After Davis arrested Duncan Blackburn, one of 
the most notorious outlaw leaders, an angry 
Wyoming newspaperman was moved to accuse 
the military of "mutiny". A report later circu-
lated that the army had initiated court martial 
proceedings against its errant possemen.20 
Scott Davis had an even more upsetting 
experience with two military guards when ban-
dits struck his treasure coach in eastern Wyo-
ming on 26 September 1877. A fierce gunfight 
terrified the troops, who refused to defend the 
coach. They "sprang out, leaving their guns 
inside, and ran away," Davis reported, "one of 
them putting his hands over his face and yelling 
with fright." When Davis was wounded and the 
attackers took possession of the coach, the 
panicky soldiers "came running back to the 
coach, crying, 'we give up, we give up.'" One 
Wyoming newspaperman accused the soldiers 
of a lack of "sand" and concluded that, had the 
enlisted men held their ground, the coach could 
have been successfully defended. No records of 
court martial proceedings against these soldiers 
have been found. 21 
In other instances, the possibility of earning 
reward money may have stimulated military 
possemen. Although some question arose about 
the eligibility of the troops to receive bounties, 
the authorities apparently resolved the matter 
in favor of the soldiers. In August 1877, Luke 
Voorhees informed the commander at Fort 
Laramie that his company "will give you $1000 
to catch [the] men." Hugh Lenox, a young 
lieutenant on the scout for hostile Indians in the 
Black Hills about this time, encountered sev-
eral men who were acting suspiciously but he let 
them pass. When a sheriff's posse overtook the 
column shortly thereafter, Lenox learned the 
men were fugitives with a $5,000 reward for 
their capture. "I had had them in my hands with 
two troops of cavalry to help hold them," Lenox 
recalled dejectedly.zz 
The Union Pacific Railroad posted a $10,000 
reward for the Joel Collins band in September 
1877. E. R. Platt, assistant adjutant, Depart-
ment of the Missouri, reminded the Fort Hays 
commandant that "your men engaged in captur-
ing robbers are clearly entitled to a portion of 
the reward," adding, "You should secure it for 
them." When a dispute arose between the 
sheriff of Ellis County, Kansas, and the soldiers 
about who had killed the outlaw leader, Joel 
Collins, and his comrade, the Fort Hays com-
mander wrote to S. H. H. Clark, general super-
intendent of the Union Pacific, urging him to 
withhold any reward payments "until an appli-
cation is duly filed for the men of the detach-
ment of this post." The outcome of the soldiers' 
claim is unknown, but in another instance, 
Lieutenant George Chase, who captured two 
robbers in Wyoming, received a $400 rewardY 
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
In the midst of this constabulary effort on the 
northern Plains, lawmakers in Washington sud-
denly accorded the professional soldiers what 
they had desired all along, relief from many law 
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enforcement activities. In June 1878 Congress, 
responding to several interest groups, abruptly 
forbade federal military personnel from serving 
in the posse comitatus. The Democrats had 
been angered at the use of troops to enforce 
revenue and election laws in the Reconstruc-
tion South, while the labor movement resented 
the employment of troops to suppress the Great 
Railway Strike of 1877. The army also regularly 
protested that the excessive demand for troop-
ers as law officers distracted the soldiers from 
their primary peacetime duty-training for war. 
Congress responded by enacting the Posse 
Comitatus Act, which prohibited United States 
marshals and county sheriffs from calling di-
rectly upon the nearest military post and sum-
moning troops for their posses. Such easy access 
had been a boon to frontier peace officers, who 
had neither the time nor the inclination to 
make a formal written application for soldiers 
through the governor and United States au-
thorities. Congress provided for a fine of up to 
$10,000 or two years imprisonment for any 
military personnel disobeying the new, more 
restrictive policy.24 
The Posse Comitatus Act threw frontier 
authorities into temporary disarray. From the 
Black Hills to New Mexico and Arizona, army 
personnel were immediately recalled from civil 
posses, and General of the Army William T. 
Sherman assured Congress that "the army is 
being guided by the strict letter" of the law. 
When United States Senator Algernon Pad-
dock of Nebraska requested military aid for 
sheriffs against white horse thieves who contin-
ued to raid the Sioux reservation herds, Sherman 
declined. He reminded the lawmaker that "Our 
officers don't usually have $10,000 handy" to 
pay the fine. Sherman could have added that his 
officers also feared law suits. In the nineteenth 
century, many Americans-anxious to protect 
the sanctity of republican institutions from 
military incursions-resorted to the courts to 
protect cherished freedoms. 25 
Frontier officials deplored the abrupt with-
drawal of military forces from civilian posses. 
On 10 September 1878, Wyoming Governor 
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John Wesley Hoyt reminded the secretary of 
war that he still needed military assistance 
against criminals and urged the secretary to 
intercede with the president. This is an "emer-
gency," said the worried territorial executive. 
The Cheyenne Daily Leader mocked Congress 
for tying the hands of government while the 
Deadwood Black Hills Daily Times even asked, 
"Have We a Government?" Jay Gould, presi-
dent of the Union Pacific Railroad, made a 
special trip to Washington to lobby for relief 
from the Posse Comitatus Act, but an effort by 
Senator Algernon Paddock and other western 
officials to persuade Congress to exempt the 
frontier states and territories failed.26 
The Posse Comitatus Act, however, turned 
out to be less restrictive than westerners had 
first believed. After several cabinet meetings in 
September and October 1878, President 
Rutherford B. Hayes and his advisers concluded 
that there were exemptions. The law did not 
interfere with the president's power to proclaim 
a domestic emergency and make troops avail-
able to civil lawmen. While the banditry in the 
Black Hills did not require a presidential proc-
lamation, Hayes did proclaim an emergency 
and called out troops to suppress a bloody New 
Mexico feud in October 1878. The Posse 
Comitatus Act also did not affect the right of 
the army to protect the national boundary and 
all public property, including the United States 
mails, enabling soldiers to ride the mail cars on 
Union Pacific trains. No doubt the plea of 
railroad baron Jay Gould had something to do 
with the frantic efforts of the Hayes Adminis-
tration to release troops for constabulary duties 
in the fall of 1878.27 
The new law prompted authorities in Wyo-
ming and Dakota territories and in Washing-
ton, D.C., to pull together to fill the void left by 
the soldiers. In September 1878, United States 
Marshal Gustave Schnitger of Wyoming se-
cretly mobilized against the Black Hills high-
waymen. Attorney General Charles Devens, 
Schnitger's superior, afforded him $2,OOO-a 
sizeable sum by the marshal's standards-to hire 
additional possemen. Postmaster General David 
Key dispatched veteran manhunter Charles 
Adams to Cheyenne with additional funds. The 
marshal deputized Adams, who then led a spe-
cial posse of ten "good frontiersmen" into the 
Black Hills. Since Laramie County, Wyoming, 
sat astride the Union Pacific Railroad and the 
Black Hills highway, Governor Hoyt reminded 
the commissioners that it was "imperative that 
every available means should be used" to fight 
the outlaws, and that the "hearty cooperation of 
all local" officials was necessary. The county 
officials responded with a five-man posse. Gov-
ernor Hoyt and his counterpart in Dakota Ter-
ritory offered rewards for the capture of the 
highwaymen. On 28 September the Daily Leader 
joyfully announced, "we now feel justified in 
making public" the mobilization. As the cleanup 
progressed into the winter months, other law 
enforcement personnel, including Nathaniel K. 
Boswell, newly elected sheriff of Albany County, 
Wyoming (county seat Laramie); the Rocky 
Mountain Detective Agency of Denver, Colo-
rado; and some vigilantes participated in the 
outlaw roundup.28 
In spite of the hesitancy of military authori-
ties to challenge the Posse Comitatus Act, 
soldiers returned in a limited way to the cam-
paign against the frontier desperadoes. As offi-
cials in Washington sought exemptions from 
the Posse Comitatus Act, officers at frontier 
military posts found ways to circumvent its 
restrictions. During Marshal Schnitger's drag-
net for highwaymen in the fall of 1878, Post 
Office Inspector Charles Adams approached 
General George Crook and requested the assis-
tance of troops in spite of the Posse Comitatus 
Act. Much to Adams's surprise, Crook fur-
loughed some soldiers whom Adams promptly 
hired for his posse. Apparently the army had 
circumvented other regulations in this way, and 
General Crook was satisfied that no soldiers 
would be punished under the Act. Soldiers in 
the Southwest also concluded that they could 
assist civilian lawmen-if the lawmen were 
overwhelmed by white outlaws who drove them 
into an army camp, a rather unlikely turn of 
events.29 
CONCLUSION 
Neither frontiersmen nor historians have 
appreciated the role of United States military 
forces in constabulary duties in the West. In the 
late 1880s historian Hubert Howe Bancroft 
concluded that bluecoats "were by no means fit 
to cope with [the] desperate characters" they 
met in the Black Hills. 
Like too many of our government servants, 
they were lazy, careless, indifferent, and stu-
pid; laborious days and sleepless nights were 
less attractive than comfortable quarters and 
regular potations. There was little glory in 
catching [outlaws]: besides, the soldiers were 
no match for them, either in activity or 
intelligence. If sheriffs cannot catch rogues, 
assuredly soldiers cannot. In mechanical 
slaughterings soldiers do very well; if well 
trained, they have not intelligence and will 
sufficient to flee danger when they see it. 
This is all as it should be for posts, to shoot 
and be shot at; but as detectives they are of 
little value.3o 
While the soldiers were by no means uni-
formly successful against white desperadoes, the 
bluecoats made some positive contributions on 
the northern Plains in the late 1870s. By 1879 
the renewed offensive of civil and military 
personnel had begun to reap benefits, as many 
highwaymen were captured and eventually sent 
to prison. While sporadic outbreaks of lawless-
ness continued to occur, civilian agencies as-
sumed greater responsibility for the suppression 
of such disturbances. The army's participation 
diminished although it did not by any means 
disappear. At the peak of the highwaymen's 
activities in the Black Hills area in the 1870s, 
civil lawmen became dependent upon the fed-
eral forces. The several military posts in the 
region could provide many free services to civil 
officials. Even when the troops failed to capture 
highwaymen, their constant and methodical 
pursuit perhaps kept the outlaws off balance 
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until local lawmen could capture them. The 
mere presence of these posts and their patrols in 
the wilderness of Wyoming and Dakota denied 
desperadoes a sanctuary. Duncan Blackburn, 
one of the most notorious of the Black Hills 
bandits, once moaned that the soldiers always 
seemed to be after him. These blue-coated 
possemen constituted the closest partner of civil 
lawmen on the northern Plains frontier in the 
1870sY 
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